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A R B I T R A T I O N

What Appeals Are Permitted
by Section 16(a)(1)(A) of the
Federal Arbitration Act?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 313–317. © 2009 American Bar Association.

Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle,
LLP, a law firm. These petitioners
recommended investment in a tax
shelter referred to as a “leveraged
option strategy” involving foreign
currency exchange options.
Following this advice, the respondents each created separate business entities, consisting of limited
liability companies, to implement
the leveraged option strategy. These
limited liability companies then
entered into investment management agreements with Bricolage
Capital LLC. Petitioners Arthur
Andersen and Curtis Mallet were
not parties to the management
agreements, which contained the
following arbitration clause:

Jay E. Grenig is a Professor of Law
at Marquette University Law
School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Prof. Grenig is the author of
Alternative Dispute Resolution
published by Thomson
Reuters/West. He is a member
of the National Academy of
Arbitrators. He can be reached
at jgrenig@earthlink.net or
(414) 288-5377.

ISSUES
Does Section 16(a)(1)(A) of the
Federal Arbitration Act provides
appellate jurisdiction over an appeal
from an order denying an application made under Section 3 to stay
claims involving nonsignatories to
an arbitration agreement?

Any controversy arising out of or
relating to this Agreement or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by
arbitration conducted in New
York, New York, in accordance
with the Commercial Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration
Association.

Does Section 3 of the Federal
Arbitration Act require a district
court to stay claims against
nonsignatories to an arbitration
agreement when the nonsignatories
can otherwise enforce the arbitration agreement under state law principles of law and equity?

As a condition of participating in
the tax shelters, the respondents
(Continued on Page 314)

FACTS

ARTHUR ANDERSEN LLP ET AL. V.
CARLISLE ET AL.
DOCKET NO. 08-146

The respondents sold their construction equipment business and
sought advice on how to minimize
the taxes on their sale from petitioners Arthur Andersen, LLP, an
accounting firm; Bricolage Capital
LLC, a “financial boutique”; and

ARGUMENT DATE:
MARCH 3, 2009
FROM: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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Case
at a
Glance
The defendants, who
were not parties to an
arbitration agreement,
unsuccessfully invoked
equitable estoppel in an
attempt to stay claims
brought against them by
the plaintiffs, who were
parties to the arbitration
agreement. The district
court denied the stay and
the defendants filed an
interlocutory appeal.
The plaintiffs are asking
the Supreme Court to
determine whether an
appeal may be taken from
a district court’s order
denying a stay application
made under Section 3
of the Federal
Arbitration Act.

were required to invest over $4 million in warrants to purchase stock
of unidentified small, high-tech
companies. The respondents formed
another entity, Respondent WJC
Strategic Investments, to buy the
warrants, which were eventually
found to be worthless. The respondents also signed individual retainer
agreements with petitioner Curtis
Mallet, for a fee of $100,000 each.
The IRS later determined that the
“leveraged option strategy” was an
abusive tax shelter but offered
amnesty to taxpayers who had
invested in them, under certain
conditions. The petitioners did not
inform the respondents of these IRS
rulings and the respondents were
eventually forced to join an IRS settlement program that required them
to pay taxes, penalties, and interest
due to federal tax authorities of
more than $25 million.
Respondents filed suit against nine
defendants, including Arthur
Andersen, Bricolage Capital, and
Curtis Mallet, alleging fraud, negligence, civil conspiracy between the
defendants, and breach of fiduciary
duty, among other counts. Relying
on the arbitration agreements with
the principal plaintiffs, Bricolage
Capital filed a motion to stay the
proceedings pending arbitration of
disputes arising under the management agreements. While that
motion was pending, Bricolage
Capital notified the court that it had
filed a petition in bankruptcy; an
automatic stay as to Bricolage
Capital was subsequently entered.
The respondents sought to step into
Bricolage Capital’s shoes, seeking
their own stay of the proceedings
based on their theory that equitable
estoppel should prevent the respondents from “avoiding arbitration”
under the contracts between
Bricolage Capital and the respondents, and, as a result, that the arbi-

tration clauses in those agreements
should be binding on the petitioners
as against all respondents. The doctrine of equitable estoppel provides
that ordinarily a party should not be
allowed to argue a position that contradicts its earlier position upon
which another party relied. The district court rejected the petitioners’
equitable-estoppel argument and
denied the motion to stay. The petitioners then sought appellate review
of that denial, invoking Section 3 of
the Federal Arbitration Act in an
effort to establish interlocutory
jurisdiction (that is, jurisdiction to
hear their appeal regarding that specific question of law even before the
district court had entered final judgment in the case) under Section 16
of the Act. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the
order denying the stay for arbitration of the dispute to which the
respondents were not signatories
was not immediately appealable
under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost,
Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597
(6th Cir. 2008). The court explained
that an interlocutory order denying
a stay for arbitration under an arbitration agreement to which the
moving party was not a signatory
does not involve “any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing” so as to be immediately appealable under the Federal
Arbitration Act.
Petitioner’s request for request for
review of the Sixth Circuit’s decision
was granted by the U.S. Supreme
Court. Arthur Andersen LLP v.
Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 529 (2008).

CASE ANALYSIS
The issue arises in the context of a
limited statutory exception to the
general rule of appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, giving courts
of appeal jurisdiction only over “final
decisions” of the district courts. A
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final decision is one that “ends the
litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United
States, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
Judicial proceedings against parties
to an arbitration agreement are generally stayed pending outcome of
arbitration. Denials of motions to
stay judicial proceedings are not
appealable as interlocutory orders
denying injunctions under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1). See Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas
Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988). Section
16(a)(1) of the Federal Arbitration
Act (9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)) confers
jurisdiction over interlocutory
appeals from the denial of a motion
to stay under Section 3 of the Act (9
U.S.C. § 3) or to compel arbitration
under Section 4 of the Act. (9
U.S.C. § 4). In addition, 9 U.S.C. § 2
provides that, with specified exceptions, a “written provision” evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy arising out of the contract
is valid and enforceable, “save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any
contract.”
Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration
Act makes available a stay of proceedings based upon “any issue
referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration.” The denial of a stay under
Section 3 is subject to interlocutory
review under Section 16.
Respondents argue that the arbitration provisions in the investment
management agreements between
the respondents and Bricolage
Capital permit them to seek a stay
under Section 3 because the action
brought by the plaintiffs involves an
issue that is referable to arbitration
under “an agreement in writing.”
They argue that this is so even if the
respondents are not signatories to
the written agreement in question

Issue No. 5 Volume 36

and are seeking to compel arbitration with the signatories to a contract with a third party that is no
longer involved in the judicial
proceedings.
The petitioners assert that the Sixth
Circuit committed two errors of
statutory interpretation, first as to
Section 16(a)(1)(A), and then as to
Section 3. They ask the Supreme
Court to reverse both errors and
remand this case to the Sixth
Circuit to consider petitioners’ arguments that respondents’ claims are
“referable to arbitration” under the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.
The petitioners argue that the Sixth
Circuit erred by deciding appellate
jurisdiction under Section
16(a)(1)(A) by reference to its
determination that on the merits,
Section 3 does not apply as a matter
of law to claims involving nonsignatories. The petitioners claim the
text of Section 16(a)(1)(A) conditions appellate jurisdiction upon
only two elements: first, that the
appellant sought relief under
Section 3, and second, that the district court denied such relief. The
petitioners say they satisfy that simple test, as they made their motion
under Section 3 and the district
court denied it. According to the
petitioners, any purported substantive defect in their Section 3 motion
speaks only to the merits of their
request for Section 3 relief, and is
therefore irrelevant to the question
of appellate jurisdiction.
The respondents say the issue in
this appeal is whether petitioners,
as nonparties to the arbitration
agreement who unsuccessfully
invoked equitable estoppel in an
attempt to force respondents to
arbitrate with them, have an automatic right to an interlocutory
appeal from the district court’s
refusal to stay respondents’ claims
against them pending arbitration.

Respondents point out that the petitioners invoked Section 16(a)(1)(A)
as the jurisdictional basis for their
attempted interlocutory appeal, and
that Section 16(a)(1)(A) limits the
interlocutory jurisdiction it confers
to orders refusing a stay under
Section 3.
The petitioners say their textual
reading of Section 16(a)(1) is confirmed by the structure of the
Federal Arbitration Act’s provisions
for appellate review, under which all
orders hostile to arbitration under
Sections 3 and 4 are immediately
appealable, whereas all Section 3
and 4 orders favorable to arbitration
are not. By its interpretation of
Section 16, the petitioners contend
the Sixth Circuit in effect created a
new subcategory of banned interlocutory appeals—a subcategory
absent from the text of Section 16.
The respondents disagree, claiming
the text of Section 3 could not be
clearer: the predicate for a stay
under Section 3 is an issue “referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” They say that petitioners’ status as nonparties to the arbitration
agreement, who therefore had to
invoke equitable estoppel, signaled
that they had no written agreement
with respondents requiring them to
arbitrate their claims against petitioners. Because Section 3 requires
such an agreement, the respondents
say the petitioners could not seek a
stay under Section 3. According to
the respondents, the stay that petitioners requested and the district
court refused to grant did not and
could not fit within the language of
Section 3. Because of this, respondents claim the order rejecting that
stay could not be immediately
appealed under Section 16(a)(1)(A),
given that the interlocutory jurisdiction it confers is limited to orders
refusing a stay under Section 3.

The petitioners contend their interpretation of Section 16(a)(1) is further supported by the Supreme
Court’s decision in the analogous
context of immunity appeals in
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299
(1996). Under that decision, appellate jurisdiction is determined “by
focusing upon the category of orders
appealed from, rather than upon the
strength of the grounds for reversing
the order.” They say the Sixth
Circuit’s analysis inverts the
Behrens test by focusing not on the
category of order appealed from
(denials of Section 3 motions) but
instead on the merits of an appellant’s arguments for reversal.
The petitioners argue their interpretation of Section 16(a)(1) is supported by considerations of judicial
efficiency. They contend their theory establishes a clear, bright-line
test for appellate jurisdiction: Was
Section 3 relief sought and denied?
The petitioners claim this test
should not disrupt district courts or
burden courts of appeals with
groundless Section 16 appeals. In
Behrens, the Supreme Court
approved of procedures adopted in
several circuits for district courts to
certify appeals as frivolous, thereby
permitting district courts to retain
jurisdiction pending appeal.
The petitioners also contend the
Sixth Circuit erred in its interpretation of Section 3, pointing out that
the Sixth Circuit held the petitioners’ Section 3 motion failed as a
matter of law because there was
no “written agreement to arbitrate”
in view of petitioners’ status as
“[non-]signator[ies] to the written
agreement in question.” The petitioners reason that the centerpiece
of the FAA is Section 2, under
which statelaw principles of “law
and equity” generally applicable to
contracts dictate the validity, revocability, and enforceability of arbitration provisions. They rely on
(Continued on Page 316)

American Bar Association

315

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987), in which the Supreme Court
recognized that whether a nonsignatory can invoke a written arbitration provision turns not on the text
of the FAA, but on state law principles made applicable by Section 2;
whether the “arbitration provision
inures to the benefit” of the
nonsignatory is determined under
such state law principles. Thus, the
petitioners assert that state law
principles of “law and equity,” and
not Section 3, control whether petitioners may enforce the arbitration
agreement.
According to the petitioners, it is
indisputable that “hundreds of years
of common law” recognize that
“non-parties” may enforce or be
bound by contracts. Applying such
principles, the petitioners say courts
have routinely held that nonsignatories may enforce or be bound to
arbitration agreements under myriad theories, including equitable
estoppel. By exempting arbitration
agreements from such ordinary
common-law rules applicable to
contracts, the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule runs contrary to the
very purpose of Section 2: to place
arbitration agreements on an equal
footing with other contracts.
It is the petitioners’ position that
the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on
Section 3 was misplaced because
Section 3 is merely a mechanism for
enforcing state law rights recognized
and protected by Section 2. They
contend Section 2 and the state law
principles it applies resolve the
issue of a nonsignatory’s rights and
obligations under an arbitration
agreement subject to the FAA.
Although Section 3 certainly
requires the existence of a written
arbitration agreement, the petitioners say that nothing in Section 3 or
Section 2 requires that the arbitration agreement be signed. Finally,
the petitioners declare that the

absence of a signature requirement
under the Federal Arbitration Act
reflects the often informal nature of
regular commercial practices and a
concern about the dampening effect
excessive formalities can have upon
arbitration.
The respondents explain that the
rules the parties ask the Supreme
Court to adopt differ in the following respects. Under petitioners’ proposed rule, an order refusing a nonsignatory’s arbitration-related stay
request is immediately appealable if
the underlying stay application
merely alleged Section 3 as its basis.
Under this rule, the label a movant
places on its stay application would
be the binding jurisdictional determinant for any interlocutory appeal
from the application’s denial. This
would leave interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction, which congressional
policy disfavors and must be narrowly construed, entirely in the
hands of the stay applicant’s lawyer,
inviting all manner of gamesmanship and manipulation. In contrast,
the respondents say the rule they
espouse recognizes that, regardless
of the label a movant might place on
its stay motion or that a district
court might place on its order denying such motion, nonsignatories
relying on equitable estoppel cannot
seek arbitration-related stays under
Section 3 because, by definition,
their stay request cannot satisfy
Section 3’s “referable to arbitration
under an agreement in writing”
requirement.
In choosing the rule respondents
espouse and dismissing petitioners’
appeal based on a lack of interlocutory jurisdiction, the respondents
say the Sixth Circuit decision properly steered well clear of the merits
of petitioners’ appeal. It is the
respondent’s position that, whenever possible, such jurisdictional rules
must be clear, predictable, brightline rules that can be applied to
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determine jurisdiction with a fair
degree of certainty from the outset.
Respondents argue that those, like
petitioners, who chose not to enter
into arbitration agreements with
respondents, and who instead had
to resort to equitable estoppel to
attempt to force respondents to
arbitrate, simply are not eligible for
interlocutory appeals under Section
16. Respondents conclude the federal policy favoring consensual arbitration cannot be stretched far
enough to sanction the nonvolitional arbitration that the petitioners’
stay request envisions.

SIGNIFICANCE
Parties to arbitration proceedings
become so by virtue of contract.
General contract rules control as to
who is entitled to the benefit of, and
who is bound by, an agreement to
arbitrate. There is some authority
for the view that a district court has
discretion to permit nonsignatories
to an agreement with an arbitration
clause to compel signatories to arbitrate their claims. The petitioners
claim they are entitled to an order
staying the judicial proceeding
based on the theory that equitable
estoppel should prevent the respondents from avoiding arbitration
under the contracts between the
respondents and Bricolage Capital.
(It has been held that the application of equitable estoppel is warranted when the signatory to a contract containing an arbitration
clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted
misconduct by both a nonsignatory
and one or more of the signatories.
See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative
Artists Agency, L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524
(5th Cir. 2000).) The question in
this proceeding is limited to the
question of whether an appellate
court has jurisdiction to hear an
appeal from a denial of a motion to
stay arbitration when the petitioners were not signatories to the arbitration agreement.

Issue No. 5 Volume 36

This jurisdictional question has
been addressed by at least three
other circuits in addition to the
Sixth Circuit. DSMC Inc. v.
Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679 (D.C.
Cir. 2003), held that because there
was no written agreement between
DSMC and Convera there was no
jurisdiction to review the district
court’s decision denying a motion to
stay judicial proceedings. In re
Universal Service Fund Telephone
Billing Practice Litig. v. Spring
Communications Co., L.P., 428 F.3d
940 (10th Cir. 2005), the court left
open the possibility that nonsignatories might be compelled by principles of equitable estoppel to arbitrate, and dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction an interlocutory appeal
from the district court’s denial of a
motion to stay proceedings. On the
other hand, Ross v. American
Express Co., 478 F.3d 96 (2d Cir.
2007), held that defendants could
appeal the district court’s refusal to
compel arbitration even though the
defendants were not signatories to
the arbitration agreement, when the
claims against the defendants were
“inextricably intertwined” with the
arbitration agreements that met the
writing requirement of the Federal
Arbitration Act).

AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Petitioners Arthur
Anderson LLP et al.
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America (Virginia
W. Hoptman (703) 394-2230)
Washington Legal Foundation
(Thomas S. Jones (412) 391-3939)

The Supreme Court now has the
opportunity to resolve the conflict
among the circuits. The Court may
also take this case as an opportunity
to clarify when nonsignatories to an
arbitration agreement may be able
to compel arbitration under the
agreement.

ATTORNEYS
PARTIES

FOR THE

For Petitioners Arthur Anderson
LLP et al. (M. Miller Baker (202)
756-8000)
For Respondents Wayne Carlisle et
al. (Paul M. De Marco (513) 6210267)
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